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THE WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE PRESENTS:
NEWS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
Part III: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
by Cecile E.M. Meijer*

Kvočka et al.
On November 2, 2001, the ICTY Trial Chamber delivered its Judgement in the Kvocka et al. case (Prosecutor v.
Miroslav Kvocka, Milojica Kos, Mlaco Radić, Zoran Zigić, and
Dragoljub Prcać, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T). The amended
indictment had charged the accused with seventeen counts
of crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war. Amongst others, the charges included persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds by way of
murder; torture and beating; sexual assault and rape;
harassment, humiliation and psychological abuse; and
confinement in inhumane conditions. Žigić was the only
accused in this case to be charged with crimes in locations
other than the Omarska camp (i.e., Keraterm and Trnopolje
camps). The indictment charged Žigić with individual
responsibility under Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute. The
others accused were charged with individual and superior
responsibility under Articles 7(1) and 7(3). The Trial
Chamber concluded that the evidence showed beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Omarska camp functioned as a
joint criminal enterprise, and found the accused guilty of
persecution as a crime against humanity, and murder, torture and cruel treatment (Žigić only) as violations of the
laws or customs of war under Article 7(1). It sentenced the
accused to prison terms ranging between five and twentyfive years. All received credit for time served.
The Kvocka et al. case concentrated largely on atrocities
committed in the Omarska camp during the summer of
1992, and the role of the accused in the camp’s operations.
The Omarska camp was a so-called “collection centre” in
the north-east of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where thousands
of detainees (mostly Muslims and Croats) were interrogated
purportedly in an attempt to identify who was a suspect of
and/or collaborator with the non-Serb opposition. The
court heard evidence about the deplorable conditions in
the camp, where food and water were poor in quality and
quantity, and where hygienic and living conditions were
grossly inadequate. The court found that the interrogations were conducted in a cruel and inhumane fashion, the
detainees were frequently subjected to mental and physical
violence throughout the camp, and the few female detainees
were subjected to various forms of sexual assault, including
rape. Both the abusive camp conditions and the acts of
extreme physical mistreatment often resulted in the death
of detainees. The Trial Chamber found that “the non-Serbs
detained . . . were subjected to a series of atrocities and that
the inhuman conditions were imposed as a means of degrading and subjugating them. Extreme brutality was systematic
in the camp and utilized as a tool to terrorize the Muslims,
Croats, and the other non-Serbs imprisoned therein.”
After finding all of the accused guilty of persecution, the
court applied the cumulative convictions test using the
two-prong test set forth in the Celebići Appeals Chamber
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judgement, and subsequently dismissed the murder and
other charges covered by the persecution conviction when
based on the same underlying conduct.
The Trial Chamber elaborated extensively on the theories of criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the
ICTY Statute, examining in particular the “joint criminal
enterprise” theory, which previous jurisprudence had
found to be included implicitly in Article 7(1). The Chamber restated the three elements identified in the Tadić
Appeals Chamber judgement that require proof in order
for joint criminal enterprise liability to arise: (1) a plurality of persons; (2) the existence of a common plan which
amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided
for in the Statute; and (3) participation of the accused in
the execution of the common plan. Given the facts of the
case, the court limited the scope of its analysis primarily to
one particular situation of joint criminal enterprise liability, namely where the accused have personal knowledge of
a system of ill-treatment and demonstrate an intent to further or otherwise participate in the system of abuse. The
court examined in depth the post World War II “concentration camp” cases.
In assessing the necessary mens rea (intent) for different
modes of participation in a joint criminal enterprise (coperpetration and aiding or abetting), the Trial Chamber,
having examined relevant post World War II jurisprudence, opined that “a co-perpetrator of a joint criminal
enterprise shares the intent to carry out the joint criminal
enterprise and performs an act or omission in furtherance of the enterprise; an aider or abettor of the joint
criminal enterprise need only be aware that his or her
contribution is assisting or facilitating a crime committed
by the joint criminal enterprise.”
The Trial Chamber examined what level of participation
is required for lower level persons to be criminally liable
under the joint criminal enterprise theory, especially those
who did not order or organize the camps, nor orchestrate
their operations. Again, the court analyzed relevant post
World War II jurisprudence and concluded that it shows
that “when a detention facility is operated in a manner
which makes the discriminatory and persecutory intent
of the operation patently clear, anyone who knowingly
participates in any significant way in the operation of the
facility or assists or facilitates its activity, incurs individual
criminal responsibility for participation in the criminal
enterprise, either as a co-perpetrator or an aider and abettor, depending upon his position in the organizational
hierarchy and the degree of his participation.” The person’s
acts or omissions must significantly assist or facilitate the
commission of the crimes, which means that the act or omission “makes an enterprise efficient or effective; e.g., a participation that enables the system to run more smoothly or
continued on next page
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without disruption.” This level of participation must be
determined on a case by case basis and depends on various
factors. Furthermore, crimes that are committed to further
the joint criminal enterprise and that are natural and foreseeable consequences of the enterprise can also be attributed to a person (aider, abettor, and co-perpetrator) who
knowingly participates in the enterprise in a significant way.
Next, the Trial Chamber carefully analyzed the criminal
responsibility of each of the accused in the joint criminal
enterprise. Using the above legal framework, the Chamber
addressed for each accused his personal background;
arrival and duration in Omarska camp; duties and position
in the camp; knowledge of camp conditions and abusive
treatment during his time in the camp; whether he physically perpetrated abuses; and whether his participation
was significant enough to incur criminal responsibility. In
addition, the court examined issues that were more specific
to a particular accused.
With respect to Kvočka, a Serb police officer, the court
found that he served in the Omarska camp in a position
which the court found to be the functional equivalent of
a deputy commander with some degree of authority over
the guards. According to the evidence, he had extensive
knowledge of the camp’s abusive practices and conditions,
but did little to prevent or ease them. He was also aware of
serious crimes being committed in the camp and sometimes
witnessed them. Nonetheless, Kvočka performed his duties
in the camp for at least seventeen days in a skillful and efficient manner, without complaint. As deputy of the camp
commander, he made a significant contribution to the
camp’s administration and functioning. Finally, the court
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Kvočka “was aware
of the context of persecution and ethnic violence prevalent
in the camp and he knew that his work in the camp facilitated the commission of crimes.” Based on the above findings, the Trial Chamber concluded that Kvočka was a coperpetrator of the joint criminal enterprise that was the
Omarska camp. The Trial Chamber convicted Kvočka
under Article 7(1) of the Statute for persecution as a crime
against humanity and for murder and torture as violations
of the laws or customs of war. He was sentenced to seven
years’ imprisonment.
The court followed largely similar reasoning with regard
to Prcać, a pensioner who was mobilized in April 1992
and worked for about twenty-two days as an administrative
aid of the Omarska camp commander, and Kos, a guard
shift leader who was involved in beatings and extortion of
detainees. Like Kvočka, both were found guilty under Article 7(1) of co-perpetration in a joint criminal enterprise and
convicted of persecution as a crime against humanity, as well
as murder and torture as violations of the laws or customs
of war. Prcać received a prison sentence of five years, while
Kos received six years.
Radić was also a guard shift leader and worked during
the entire three months that the Omarska camp was in operation. He exerted substantial authority over certain guards
and his shift was notorious for the camp’s most brutal
cases of physical and mental abuse or mistreatment. Radić
knew of these crimes and their discriminatory purpose, and
frequently was exposed directly to them. The Trial Chamber found that he never used his authority to stop the
crimes committed by the guards in his shift, and that his
failure to do so in fact encouraged the guards to continue,

as Radić seemed to condone their actions. In addition, Radić
personally committed or threatened to commit the crime
of rape and other forms of sexual violence against non-Serb
women. The court qualified his contribution to the camp’s
maintenance and functioning as substantial, concluding
that he “willingly and intentionally contributed to the furtherance of the joint criminal enterprise.” Radić was found
guilty, under Article 7(1), as a co-perpetrator of persecution, murder and torture including rape and other forms
of sexual violence, all of which were committed as part of
the joint criminal enterprise operative in the Omarska
camp. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison.
Lastly, the court considered the alleged crimes perpetrated by Žigić, a taxi driver who frequently went to the
Omarska camp to abuse detainees. The Trial Chamber
found that Žigić personally and directly committed crimes
on discriminatory grounds, that his participation in the joint
criminal enterprise was significant, and that he knew of the
persecutory character of the crimes. This made him a coperpetrator in the joint criminal enterprise at Omarska. In
relation to the Omarska atrocities, Žigić was found guilty
of persecution, murder, and torture. Žigić was also charged
with and convicted of crimes committed in the Keraterm
and Trnopolje camps, namely persecution as a crime
against humanity, as well as murder, torture, and cruel
treatment as violations of the laws or customs of war. The
court sentenced Žigić to twenty-five years’ imprisonment.

Part IV — International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
General
During 2001, several institutional changes took place at
the ICTR. On March 1, 2001, Mr. Adama Dieng of Senegal was sworn in as the new Registrar of the ICTR. Pursuant
to UN Security Council Resolution 1329 of November 30,
2000, Judge Winston Churchill Matanzima Maqutu of
Lesotho and Judge Arlette Ramaroson of Madagascar were
appointed as the two additional judges to the Arushabased ICTR. Furthermore, two ICTR judges assumed their
responsibilities in the Hague as new members of the
Appeals Chamber that is common to both the ICTR and
ICTY: Judge Mehmet Güney from Turkey and Judge Asoka
de Zoysa Gunawardana of Sri Lanka. Judge Andrésia Vaz
of Senegal replaced the late Judge Laïty Kama (also of
Senegal) who died in May 2001. In the summer of 2001,
ICTR President Pillay requested the UN to appoint ad
litem judges, “to enable the timely completion of the mandate of the Tribunal.”
During 2001, the ICTR issued several judgements on the
merits. The Appeals Chamber rendered judgements in
the Akayesu, Kayishema and Ruzindana, and Musema cases.
Of these three cases, only the Akayesu appeals judgement
is reviewed here. The ICTR Trial Chamber delivered one
judgement on the merits: the Bagilishema case, the first
ICTR acquittal on genocide charges.
Appeals Chamber
Akayesu
On June 1, 2001, the Appeals Chamber rendered its
Judgement in The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No.
continued on next page
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ICTR-96-4-A. Akayesu was the “bourgmestre” (mayor) of
Taba during the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Trial Chamber had found Akayesu guilty of genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide and crimes against
humanity, but not guilty of complicity in genocide, and of
violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Article 4(2)(e) of Additional Protocol II (judgement of September 2, 1998). The Trial Chamber had sentenced him to life imprisonment. Both Akayesu and the
Prosecution appealed. The Appeals Chamber dismissed
all of Akayesu’s challenges, thus affirming his convictions
and sentence. On December 9, 2001, Akayesu was transferred to Mali to serve his prison term.
Akayesu’s grounds of appeal were largely of a procedural and evidentiary nature. For example, Akayesu claimed
that he had been denied the right to be defended by counsel of his choice, and the right to competent counsel. Other
appeals grounds addressed, inter alia, allegations that the tribunal was biased and partisan; improper amendment of the
original indictment during trial; improper treatment of
prior witness statements; out of court evidence; improper
hearsay evidence; irregularities in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses; and sentencing. All of
Akayesu’s grounds of appeal failed.
The grounds of appeal raised by the Prosecution
addressed alleged errors of law by the Trial Chamber, which
all fell outside the scope of Article 24 of the ICTR Statute.
Article 24 requires that an appeal must pertain to an error
of law which invalidates the decision or an error of fact which
has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. The Prosecution
acknowledged that its appeals grounds would have no bearing on the Trial Chamber’s judgement, but argued that they
were nonetheless “important matters of general significance to the Tribunal’s jurisprudence.” The Appeals Chamber agreed and ruled that it has jurisdiction to determine
such issues even if they are the only ones put forward by a
party on appeal, provided the issues are “of interest to legal
practice of the Tribunal and . . . have a nexus with the case
at hand.” The Chamber found that the Prosecution’s
grounds of appeal met both requirements. In his Dissenting Opinion, Judge Nieto-Navia disagreed with the Chamber’s majority on this point and expressed the view that Article 24 of the Statute should be given a strict interpretation.
In considering the Prosecution’s grounds of appeal,
the Appeals Chamber made important pronouncements
on three issues: (1) whether a “public agent or government
representative test” applies to determine a person’s culpability for violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions; (2) the scope of discriminatory intent in
relation to crimes against humanity; and (3) whether instigation as articulated under Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute
must be direct and public. In its disposition, the Appeals
Chamber sets out the relevant legal findings regarding
these points of law raised by the Prosecution.
In order to answer the question whether the perpetrator of a Common Article 3 violation must be a public agent
or government representative in order to incur individual
criminal responsibility, the Appeals Chamber examined the
ICTR Statute, and the text, object, and purpose of Common
Article 3. The Chamber found that neither the ICTR
Statute nor the text of Common Article 3 explicitly limits
such responsibility to a particular group of individuals.
32

Seen in conjunction with the duty under Common Article
3 to afford minimum protection to victims, the Chamber
opined that “it does not follow that the perpetrator of a violation of Article 3 must of necessity have a specific link” with
a particular category of persons. Furthermore, although in
most cases there may exist a nexus between the perpetrator of the violation of Common Article 3 and one particular party to the conflict, “such a special relationship is not
a condition precedent to the application of common Article 3 and, hence of Article 4 of the Statute.”
The second issue concerned a contradiction in the Trial
Chamber judgement where it had found that in case of murder and rape under Article 3 of the Statute, the perpetrator must have the discriminatory intent vis-a-vis the victim,
while in case of extermination and torture “the attack must
be on discriminatory grounds.” The Appeals Chamber
opined that the discriminatory grounds in the chapeau of
Article 3 are a “restriction of jurisdiction,” and that crimes
against humanity “continue to be governed in the usual
manner by customary international law, namely that discrimination is not a requirement for the various crimes
against humanity, except where persecution is concerned.”
The requirement remains, however, that the attack be
against the civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial, or religious grounds.
Finally, the court addressed whether instigation under
Article 6(1) of the ICTR Statute must be direct and public.
The Appeals Chamber rejected this proposition as being
inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the provision. Although incitement to genocide contains an additional element requiring that the incitement be direct and
public, such additional element does not exist for instigation under Article 6(1), according to the Chamber.
Trial Chamber
Bagilishema
On June 7, 2001, the ICTR Trial Chamber delivered its
Judgement in The Prosecutor v. Ignace Bagilishema, Case No.
ICTR-95-1A-T. The amended indictment charged Bagilishema with seven counts of genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II. He was charged with individual
and superior responsibility under Articles 6(1) and 6(3) of
the ICTR Statute. In a landmark decision, the Trial Chamber unanimously acquitted Bagilishema of three counts,
including genocide. The Chamber’s majority found him
also not guilty of the remaining four charges which included
complicity in genocide, with Judge Mehmet Güney dissenting (Separate and Dissenting Opinion). Thus, Bagilishema was acquitted of all charges.
During the Rwanda genocide, Bagilishema was the
“bourgmestre” (mayor) of Mabanza commune, which belonged
to the Kibuye Prefecture headed by Prefect Clément Kayishema (Kayishema lost his appeal before the ICTR on
June 1, 2001, and is currently serving a prison sentence for
the remainder of his life for genocide). Following the
downing of the plane of the Rwandan president on April
6, 1994, and the start of hostilities, people began to seek
refuge at the bureau communal (communal office) in
Mabanza. Due to security problems in Mabanza, on April 13,
1994, the refugees moved to two sites in Kibuye: the Stadium
continued on next page
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and the Home St. Jean Complex (Complex). Thousands
of refugees were detained in harsh conditions at the Kibuye
Stadium, without food, water, or sanitation. A few days
after their arrival, many of those held at the Stadium and
the Complex were massacred.
The Trial Chamber did not hold Bagilishema directly
responsible for the mistreatment of the refugees in the
Stadium or for the massacres because the Prosecution had
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he incurred
responsibility. The Chamber also found unproven the Prosecution’s allegation that in instructing the refugees to move
to Kibuye, the accused “ ‘knew or had reason to know that
attacks at these locations [were] imminent.’” Moreover, it
found that the Prosecution had failed to show that Bagilishema “was notified or should have known about the
inhumane conditions at the Stadium, or about the attack
on the Complex, or about the imminent attack on the Stadium.” Finally, the court found that the Prosecution had not
demonstrated that the accused’s failure to take sufficient follow-up actions (e.g., punishment) as “bourgmestre” amounted
to acquiescence in the killings, constituting aiding and
abetting. Judge Güney disagreed with these findings.
In the period April 13 to July 1994, killings continued
to take place in Mabanza and the Prosecution charged
Bagilishema with several individual instances. In each case,
however, the Chamber found the accused not criminally
responsible because the allegations had not been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Lastly, the amended indictment charged Bagilishema
with crimes in relation to the establishment and operation
of several roadblocks at which some people, in particular
Bigirimana and Judith, had been killed. In addition to
examining the individual and superior criminal liability of
the accused in these cases under Article 6(1) and Article
6(3) (which both failed), the Trial Chamber analyzed
whether Bagilishema was responsible because of gross negligence. The court described this form of liability as “a
species of liability by omission” that would be available “if
the Prosecution were to show that the Accused had been
grossly negligent in his administration of one or more
roadblocks under his control, such negligence causing
the murder of Tutsi civilians (by roadblock staff).”
The Trial Chamber held that for liability on the basis of
criminal negligence to arise in this case, the Prosecution
not only had to prove Bagilishema’s public duty in security
matters, but also the following four cumulative elements:
(1) “that one or more crimes were committed in connection with identified roadblocks;” (2) “that [Bagilishema] was
responsible for the administration of those roadblocks
because he was involved in their establishment, acquiesced
to their continuing existence, or more generally because
they came under his control as bourgmestre;” (3) “that measures, if any, taken by [Bagilishema] to detect and prevent
crimes in connection with the stated roadblocks were
clearly inadequate in the circumstances;” and (4) “that
the crimes in question would have been detected or prevented had [Bagilishema] administered the roadblocks
with reasonable diligence.” The Chamber found that not
all of these elements had been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt; in particular, the Prosecution had failed to prove
“the Accused’s wanton disregard for high-risk activities at

roadblocks” and that “having established the Trafipro
roadblock, the Accused neglected to regulate the conduct
of those staffing it, thus causing the deaths of Bigirimana
and Judith.” Consequently, the court also declined to hold
Bagilishema responsible on the basis of criminal negligence. The Prosecution has appealed this acquittal.
Judge Güney disagreed in his Separate and Dissenting
Opinion on two points. In his view, there was sufficient evidence to hold Bagilishema responsible as an accomplice
for the killings of thousands at Kibuye, and for the crimes
committed against civilians at the Trafipro roadblock. 
* Cecile E.M. Meijer is Legal Coordinator of the War Crimes
Research Office at the Washington College of Law.

International Criminal Court
Officially Established

O

n April 11, 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) officially was launched.
The Rome Statute creating the ICC
received more than the sixty ratifications required
for its creation. At a UN ceremony on April 11,
ten countries—Bosnia, Bulgaria, Cambodia,
Congo, Ireland, Jordan, Mongolia, Niger, Romania, and Slovakia—deposited their instruments
of ratification, bringing to sixty-six the number
of states that have ratified the Rome Statute.
The United States boycotted the April 11 ceremony. Further, the Bush Administration has
maintained that it will refuse to seek Senate ratification of the Rome Statute and has threatened to nullify the U.S. signature. The ICC will
be the first permanent court to try individuals
accused of war crimes, genocide, and crimes
against humanity. Its historic creation is the culmination of four years of negotiations and ratification proceedings worldwide. The Court will
be based at The Hague, and the Rome Statute
will officially enter into force on July 1, 2002. For
more information about the ICC, visit the Coalition for the ICC website at www.iccnow.org. 
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